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The modern court is changing and part of this 
development is a result of the increased use of 
technology. In particular, the use of multimedia 
applications have enabled legal teams to present 
evidence in new and novel ways; however, 
animations and computer generated exhibits (CGE) 
have recently been the subject of debate over their 
potential to unduly influence court decisions. A 
growing body of empirical studies in this area 
suggests that major differences in trial outcome 
could result from the inclusion of animation 
evidence. Subtle changes to the style and format of 
CGEs can be problematic and produce disparate 
outcomes in experimental studies. This paper 
reviews some of the leading research and 
commentary in the field of electronic court evidence, 
with an emphasis on juror decision making. 
Specifically, it outlines the way in which decision 
making errors (for example, the hindsight bias) are 
unduly influenced by animation evidence and the 
way in which CGEs can initiate features of jury 
decision models (e.g. the ‘critical event’ in Stochastic 
Processing). The use of CGE in recent cases will be 
discussed along with suggestions for potential policy 
implications and avenues of future research. 
 
Introduction 
The increased use of multi-media, animations and 
computer generated exhibits (CGE) in the court has 
raised a number of concerns from legal professionals 
and academics alike.1 In particular, their potential to 
unduly influence or even mislead jurors and other 
legal decision makers (e.g. coroners), extends beyond 
issues surrounding the style and quality of these 
                                                          
1 Megan A. Dunn, Peter Salovey, and Neal Feigenson, ‘The Jury 
Persuaded (and Not): Computer Animation in the Courtroom’, Law & 
Policy, Volume 28, Issue 2, 2006, 228-248; Damian Schofield and 
Stephen Mason, Using Graphical Technology to Present Evidence. 
In Stephen Mason, general editor, Electronic Evidence (3rd Edition, 
London: LexisNexis, 2012), Chapter 6; Gareth Norris, ‘ The 
shortcomings of computer-generated exhibits’, Criminal Law and 
Justice Weekly, Volume 177, Issue 40, 2013, 808-809.  
presentations.2 Previously, the conventional wisdom 
held that the use of multi-media in court was 
essentially no different to more established methods 
– the ‘chalkboard and easel’ – and that good 
preparation and inventive delivery was not 
fundamentally different in the age of multi-media 
technology than in previous decades.3 However, more 
recently, and as the capabilities of the ‘tools’ have 
pushed the boundaries of what is possible (for 
example, immersive Virtual Reality), commentators 
are suggesting a more systematic approach to 
reviewing these practices.4 To date, there are only a 
limited number of relatively separate empirical 
studies and more general legal opinions that serve to 
curtail an otherwise expanding industry in trial 
support software and litigation consultancy. 
Many of these empirical examinations of CGE have 
demonstrated that different outcomes (e.g. guilty/not 
guilty) are possible when animations are introduced 
into experimental scenarios with samples of mock 
jurors serving as participants.5 One of the earliest and 
most cited empirical examples was by Saul Kassin and 
Megan Dunn, where they demonstrated the influence 
the introduction of an animation had on an equivocal 
suicide case.6 Theoretically, the different positions in 
which the body was discovered illustrated the poor 
understanding that the subjects (mock jurors) had for 
the physical behaviour of falling objects. It was 
demonstrated that it was experimentally feasible to 
                                                          
2 Neal Feigenson, ‘Visual evidence’, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 
Volume 17, Issue 2, 2010, 149-154. 
3 Fred Galves, ‘Where the not-so-wild things are: Computers in the 
courtroom, the federal rules of evidence, and the need for 
institutional reform and more judicial acceptance’, Harvard Journal of 
Law and Technology, Volume 13, 2000, 161–302. 
4 Elizabeth C. Wiggins, ‘What we know and what we need to know 
about the effects of courtroom technology’, William & Mary Bill of 
Rights Journal, Volume 12, 2003, 731-744; Neal Feigenson and 
Christina Spiesel, Law on Display: The Digital Transformation of 
Legal Persuasion and Judgement, (2009, New York: NYU Press). 
5 Neal Feigenson, ‘Visual Evidence’, Psychonomic Bulletin and 
Review, Volume 17, Issue 2, 149-154. 
6 Saul M. Kassin and Megan A. Dunn, ‘ Computer-animated displays 
and the jury: facilitative and prejudicial effects’, Law and Human 
Behaviour, Volume 21, 1997, 269-281. 
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manipulate judgements for believing that a person 
could have fallen or jumped from a building, 
dependent upon the inclusion of supporting or 
contradictory animation evidence. Another study 
addressed similar questions over the inclusion of 
animation evidence from a more cognitive-
information processing perspective.7 Morell compared 
animations with more static pictorial illustrations and 
discovered that, in conjunction with expert testimony, 
recall following a two-week delay was improved when 
subjects had observed an animation. Additionally, a 
number of other experiments have also served to 
highlight that judgments constructed around colour,8 
angle of view,9 order effects10 and familiarity with 
case11 can be influenced by the presence or 
manipulation of an animation. Dunn and colleagues 
reviewed the extant literature and suggest that whilst 
there appears to be a potential effect from the use of 
animations on court decisions, we nevertheless 
understand little about why and under what 
circumstances this is problematic.12 
There are, however, also a number of fundamental 
issues associated with utilising these approaches to 
investigate the wider influence of multi-media in 
court. The first is that they seldom acknowledge the 
fundamental problem with research into juries more 
generally.13 The mock juror is largely ‘artificial’ in that 
their decisions – most usually a binary guilty or not-
guilty – lack ecological validity. In essence, without 
formal accountability for decisions, jury research is 
limited in its potential to draw reliable and valid 
                                                          
7 Linda C. Morell, ‘ New technology: experimental research on the 
influence of computer-animated displays on jurors’, Southwestern 
University Law Review, Volume 28, 1999, 411-415. 
8 Gareth Norris and Heather Reeves, ‘The effects of stereotypes on 
perceptions of speed and culpability: the impact of animation 
evidence’, International Review of Law and Technology, Volume 26, 
2012, 37-48. 
9 Gareth Norris, ‘Effect of animation angle on perceptions of 
culpability and speed in a road traffic accident’, Psychiatry, 
Psychology and Law, Volume 20, Issue 2, 2013, 248-254. 
10 Gareth Norris, ‘Order effects in animated sequences of Computer 
Generated Evidence (CGE)’, Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 
Volume 20, Issue, 6, 2013, 909-920. 
11 Robert B. Bennett, Jordan H. Leibman, and Richard E. Fetter, 
‘Seeing is believing; or is it? An empirical study of computer 
simulations as evidence’, Wake Forest Law Review, Volume 34, 
1999, 257-294. 
12 Dunn, Salovey and Feigenson, 244. 
13 David DeMatteo and Natalie Anumba, ‘The Validity of Jury 
Decision-Making Research’, in Joel Lieberman and Daniel Krauss, 
Jury Psychology: Social Aspects of Trial Processes (2009, 
Dartmouth: Ashgate), Chapter 1. 
inferences.14 Secondly, empirical studies by their very 
nature seek to emulate the experimental design by 
manipulating one or two significant variables in order 
to test the effect on the outcome.15 Again, this is 
overly simplistic; during the course of a trial many 
pieces of evidence and testimony are introduced and 
cross-examined. Some of these may be struck from 
the record and others may be discredited. Judges may 
impose legal standards of proof and guidance on the 
way the law is to be imposed.16 Whilst the animation 
may be influential, it does not appear in isolation. 
Hence, it is necessary to consider how animations and 
CGE fit into the wider theoretical models of juror 
decision making in order for us to appreciate where in 
the process they may exert undue influence and the 
mechanisms which may limit this potential to 
prejudice a trial. 
 
Models of juror decision making 
Early mathematical models of juror decision making 
used Bayesian reasoning to demonstrate the mental 
processes undertaken by jurors during a trial.17 In its 
basic form, Bayes Theorem is a relatively simple 
mathematical rule which incorporates hypothesis 
testing alongside probability estimates. Specifically, it 
serves to calculate conditional probabilities from a 
range of likely scenarios. Bayes’ theorem is stated 
mathematically as the following simple form: 
  
For proposition A and evidence B, 
P(A), the prior probability, is the initial 
degree of belief in A. 
P(A|B), the conditional probability, is the 
degree of belief having accounted for B. 
The quotient P(B|A)/P(B) represents the 
support B provides for A. 
                                                          
14 Brian H. Bornstein, ‘The ecological validity of jury simulations: Is 
the jury still out?’, Law and Human Behavior, Volume 35, 1999, 75-
91. 
15 Brian H. Bornstein and Sean G. McCabe, ’Jurors of the absurd. 
The role of consequentiality in jury simulation research’, Florida 
State University Law Review, Volume 32, 2005, 443-467. 
16 Richard L. Wiener, Daniel A. Krauss, D. A. and Joel D. Lieberman, 
‘Mock jury research: Where do we go from here?’, Behavioral 
Sciences and the Law, Volume 29, 2011, 467–479. 
17 Reid Hastie, ‘Introduction’, In Reid Hastie, general editor, Inside 
the Juror: The Psychology of Juror Decision Making (1993, New 
York: Cambridge University Press), Chapter 1. 
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Hence, for any particular outcome (A), we are 
interested in knowing how much can be predicted by 
something else occurring (B) and vice-versa. Bayesian 
models of juror decision making assume that decision 
making is sequential and multiplicative; as each new 
piece of information (evidence) is received the juror 
multiplies the probability of it occurring by the initial 
estimation of guilt.18 When deliberation is over, the 
juror will then compare their approximation of guilt 
with their threshold for conviction and vote either 
guilty or not guilty. 
Bayesian models have not received much support 
from empirical studies in this area; however, Bayesian 
reasoning has been observed in a number of legal 
cases. Firstly, what is known as the 
defendants/prosecutors fallacy shows how 
conditional probability is widely misunderstood, not 
just by jurors, but also barristers and judges. The often 
cited case of Sally Clark demonstrated how Bayesian 
estimates were incorrectly presented and resulted in 
a potential error in her initial conviction. Secondly, 
Bayesian reasoning was specifically instructed to form 
the basis of legal inference in the case of R v Adams.19 
Here, the forensic expert correctly instructed jurors 
that the possibility of a match between the suspect 
and Adams was 1:200 million.20 The statistician 
employed to instruct the jury did an admirable job of 
explaining how Bayesian reasoning worked, but 
despite all of the other evidence suggesting innocence 
(incorrect age, false line-up identification and proven 
alibi), the jury subsequently convicted Adams in both 
the original and retrial. Hence, the applicability of 
Bayesian models is perhaps limited to a theoretical 
discussion as it appears in practice that these are 
overly complex to operationalise. In relation to where 
CGE and animation evidence ‘fits’ within a Bayesian 
perspective, it again appears less problematic. Using 
this mathematical model, any animation presented 
would be treated in much the same way as all the 
other evidence; jurors would multiply whether the 
event unfolded as demonstrated in line with their 
prior assumption of guilt or innocence (between 0-1).  
                                                          
18 Reid Hastie, ‘Algebraic models of jury decision making’, in Reid 
Hastie, general editor, Inside the Juror: The Psychology of Juror 
Decision Making (1993, New York: Cambridge University Press), 
Chapter 4. 
19 R v Adams [1996] 2 Cr App R 467, [1996] Crim LR 898, CA and R 
v Adams [1998] 1 Cr App R 377, The Times, 3 November 1997, CA. 
20 Peter Donnelly, ‘Appealing Statistics’, Significance, Volume 2, 
Issue 1, 2005, 46–48. 
The only potential issue for considering CGE in the 
Bayesian tradition is whether the animation could 
lead the ‘mental meter’ to reach one of the critical or 
absolute values (0 or 1), whereby it would essentially 
‘freeze’ and remain so until verdicts were requested. 
Potentially a very convincing or poorly prepared 
animation could tip the scales to convict or acquit in a 
similar way in which the DNA evidence affected the 
decision in R v Adams. The limitation of this 
explanation is that we are unsure about why this 
might occur and exactly how the animation might 
interact with other evaluations of evidence and 
estimations of guilt and innocence. Stochastic 
Processing Models on the other hand, incorporate 
error variance into the decision making system.21 
Stochastic reasoning also involves the estimation of 
probabilities; however, it differs from Bayesian and 
other more traditional algebraic models of juror 
decision making, in that it contrasts a number of 
different potential outcomes for each event and 
evaluates these against their probable outcome. The 
first to propose the stochastic process were Ewart 
Thomas and Anthony Hogue,22 themselves building on 
the work of Davis some years earlier with a particular 
interest in the variability of decision making based 
upon jury size. 
Stochastic processes are essentially explanations of 
events which occur continuously, yet independently. 
In a similar way to Bayesian predictions, stochastic 
processes are probability models which the final 
outcome is unknown yet importantly have some 
outcomes which are more likely than others. From a 
theoretical perspective, stochastic reasoning is a type 
of Poisson model in that it can be used to predict the 
outcome of independent events that have a variable 
pattern. Stochastic models have been shown to be 
useful in accounting for a range of human behaviour. 
For example, we could apply Poisson models to 
understanding such phenomenon as the number of 
buses that will arrive at a stop or number of people 
who visit a restaurant in a set period. Kerr suggests 
that in legal situations, stochastic reasoning can be 
applied to evaluating the diversity of case-specific 
knowledge when particular jurors are assigned to 
                                                          
21 Norbert Kerr, ‘Stochastic models of jury decision making’, in Reid 
Hastie, general editor, Inside the Juror: The Psychology of Juror 
Decision Making (1993, New York: Cambridge University Press), 
Chapter 5. 
22 Ewart A. Thomas and Anthony Hogue, ‘Apparent weight of 
evidence, decision criteria, and confidence ratings in juror decision 
making’, Psychological Review, Volume 83, Issue 6, 1976, 442-465. 
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cases. In the dominant Poisson model (of which 
several were evaluated by Kerr), two main phases are 
undertaken. The first involves an estimation of the 
weight of evidence for or against a defendant. 
Secondly, this weight is considered against a decision 
criterion – assumed to be the legal standard of proof – 
and if this exceeds this critical value, then a guilty 
verdict will be recorded. The closer these are, the 
more confident the juror is in their final decision.23 
One of the main limitations of the stochastic model of 
juror decision making is that it does not elaborate on 
the actual cognitive processes and individual 
differences between jurors; advocates of the Poisson 
model are more interested in the net end result than 
the underlying influences initiating this outcome. 
However, one particular and relatively unique aspect 
of this account of juror decision making processes 
which has potential relevance to CGE is what is 
referred to as the ‘Critical Event’ in stochastic 
models.24 The critical event is a feature of stochastic 
reasoning whereby when a particularly compelling 
piece of evidence or testimony is received, the 
‘mental meter’ of defendant guilt is frozen at this 
point. Subsequent testimony is immaterial in altering 
decisions, and if the opinion of the defendant’s 
culpability falls within the parameters of their 
conviction threshold, then a guilty verdict will be 
recorded. For example, in the trial of OJ Simpson, the 
defendant was asked to try on a blood soaked glove 
found at his house.25 The dramatic scene shown at the 
televised trial saw Simpson struggling to pull the 
garment onto his hand (although there was later 
suggestion that this evidence may have been 
tampered with26). The resulting instruction to the jury 
‘If it doesn’t fit, you must acquit’ was for many the 
pivotal point in the trial – the ‘critical event’ in 
                                                          
23 Lora M. Levett, Erin M. Danielson, Margaret B. Kovera, and Brian 
L. Cutler, ‘The psychology of jury and juror decision making’, in Neil 
Brewer and Kipling D. Williams, Psychology and Law: An Empirical 
Perspective (2005, New York: The Guilford Press), Chapter 11. 
24 Kerr, 116 
25 Linda Deutsch, ‘OJ Simpson Murder Trial: “If It Doesn't Fit, You 
Must Acquit”’, NBC Los Angles, 11 June 2014, 
http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/OJ-Simpson-20-Years-
Later-Glove-Fit-Darden-Dunne-Murder-Trial-of-the-Century-
262534821.html . 
26 Philip Sherwell, ‘OJ Simpson murder trial glove ‘was tampered 
with’ by defence lawyer Johnnie Cochran, claims prosecutor’, The 
Telegraph, 8 September 2012, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/95308
38/OJ-Simpson-murder-trial-glove-was-tampered-with-by-defence-
lawyer-Johnnie-Cochran-claims-prosecutor.html . 
stochastic terms. Quite feasibly, an animation could 
take the form of the critical event. 
The variable nature of the stochastic models assumes 
that various different accounts or estimates can result 
from the evidence presented. Holding several 
scenarios in contention would appear to be 
representative of good decision making, whereby a 
number of hypotheses are evaluated and eliminated. 
The Story Model of juror decision making, on the 
other hand, contends that jurors do not necessarily 
hold one ‘global’ judgment of guilt or innocence 
throughout a trial, but rather create a number of 
scenarios or stories from the evidence received.27 
Unlike the previous mathematical explanations, 
Pennington and Hastie’s Story Model alternative is 
considered to be a cognitive or ‘explanation-based’ 
model, which instead relies upon the assumption that 
jurors are active participants in a trial and will weigh 
up the validity and importance of evidence in line with 
their previous knowledge and experiences. 
In order to assimilate the evidence received during a 
trial, the theory presumes that jurors integrate these 
together in a causal chain of events (in essence a 
story). In any given trial, information is not generally 
presented chronologically, but rather in a disjointed 
and artificial sequence. Additionally, jurors 
themselves are not permitted to ask questions of 
witnesses and experts and hence their accounts may 
be incomplete or ambiguous. Jurors are then given 
the task of creating these causal pathways into an 
accessible narrative which may involve estimation and 
reliance on previous similar situations in order to 
complete any missing or incomplete connections. 
Pennington and Hastie’s Story Model has perhaps 
been the most widely accepted of juror decision 
making models, if only because it is relatively easier to 
comprehend than algebraic alternatives.28 
Additionally, the story metaphor ‘fits’ into the way we 
generally think about criminal events in particular; 
popular media portrayals of the CSI genre have been 
successful by exploiting our quest to construct 
meaningful accounts, even potentially generating 
their own influence on jurors. Importantly, the ‘CSI 
Effect’ is assumed to be a result of this requirement to 
build complete and consistent accounts of events; 
                                                          
27 Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, ‘The story model for juror 
decision making’, in Reid Hastie, general editor, Inside the Juror: 
The Psychology of Juror Decision Making (1993, New York: 
Cambridge University Press), Chapter 8. 
28 Levett, Danielson, Kovera and Cutler, 372  
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missing or unexplained evidence hinders or creates 
doubt in this process.29 Hence, the use of CGE and 
story model explanations is remarkably similar in 
scope to the theory of the story model of jury decision 
making proposed by Pennington and Hastie in that it 
creates a logical sequence of events in the mind of the 
observer [the juror] and evidence is then assimilated 
into this account. Issues of Coverage and Coherence 
(including Consistency, Plausibility and Completeness) 
are the vehicles with which the story is aligned with 
the version of events proposed by defence or 
prosecution.30 
There are a number of empirical studies which have 
provided support for the Story Model as a relatively 
acceptable representation of how jurors go about 
making legal decisions in a case. A review in 2005 by 
Levett and colleagues led them to conclude: 
‘[…] jurors were more likely to find the 
defendant guilty in those cases in which the 
evidence favoured guilt when they read the 
evidence in story form […] when it was easier 
for the jurors to create a story, they were 
more likely to decide in accordance with the 
preponderance of evidence.’31 
Hence, ‘assisting’ the jury to make a consistent, 
plausible and complete story is likely to favour a guilty 
verdict and the use of CGE would appear to be a 
major facilitator of this process. Potentially it does this 
through a schema known as the Simulation Heuristic 
or Counterfactual Thinking. Developing on work 
related to the Availability Heuristic (whereby we test 
different explanations based upon our existing 
knowledge of similar events), the simulation heuristic 
was proposed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
in 1982 as a more complete account of how we 
develop and test multiple versions of events to 
understand what we believe ultimately occurred and 
why.32 Importantly, the simulation heuristic – as with 
all judgment biases – is in essence a mental shortcut 
allowing us to make cognitive demands more 
manageable or to decrease dissonance and 
                                                          
29 Simon A. Cole and Rachel Dioso-Villa, ‘Investigating the CSI 
Effect Effect: Media and Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law’, Stanford 
Law Review, Volume 61, 2008-2009, 1335-1374. 
30 Pennington and Hastie, 199. 
31 Levett, Danielson, Kovera and Cutler, 375 
32 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘The simulation heuristic’, in 
Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, Amos Tversky, Judgment under 
uncertainty: heuristics and biases, (1998, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), Chapter 14. 
uncertainty: ‘The ease with which the simulation of a 
system reaches a particular state is eventually used to 
judge the propensity of the (real) system to produce 
that state.’33 We favour explanations that are easy to 
understand over ones which require more taxing 
mental processing to reach firm conclusions. 
In testing the simulation hypothesis, Kahneman and 
Tvserky presented subjects with two accounts of 
people whom had missed their flights by either 5 or 
30 minutes. Although the outcome was the same – 
both were unable to travel – over 90 per cent of the 
participants in the study suggested that the person 
that had arrived at the airport after 5 minutes had 
elapsed since their flight closed would be the more 
disappointed. It is assumed that in mentally recreating 
events, people opt for explanations which are less 
complex to mentally represent (that is creating 
reasons as to why we might be 30 minutes late is 
more multifaceted than, for example, getting stuck in 
traffic and being only 5 minutes late). Similarly when 
requested to mentally ‘undo’ a vehicle collision 
scenario, subjects opted for easier to visualise 
explanations rather than the most probable which 
was that the two cars had simply arrived at the same 
place at the same time: ‘[…] cognitive rules that 
govern ease of mental undoing […] could be called 
counterfactual emotions because of their dependence 
on a comparison of reality with what might or should 
have been.’34 Whereas Bayesian and Stochastic 
models of decision making (including jury models) 
assume some prior estimation of probability, 
counterfactual thinking suggests those events which 
are simpler to mentally recreate will emerge as the 
most plausible and likely. 
In considering the likely interface with the Simulation 
Heuristic and Story Model with CGE – and ultimately 
the potential influence upon jury decision making – 
we can examine a number of elements that make up 
this judgement bias to explain how this process is 
aided by the animation. What is referred to as a 
downhill change is where an incongruent or surprising 
element of a story is removed to increase the internal 
consistency; conversely, an uphill change is where an 
incompatible element is introduced and decreases the 
plausibility of the account. During their experiments, 
Kahneman and Tversky found little evidence of people 
making uphill changes; the preference for removing 
                                                          
33 Kahneman and Tversky, 201-202. 
34 Kahneman and Tversky, 205 
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inconsistent elements from a story is seemingly the 
least mentally taxing. Hence, we can predict that if the 
simulation heuristic is present in legal reasoning – as 
suggested in one study by Miller and McFarland35 – 
the use of animation evidence can make a significant 
impression on the comprehension and assimilation of 
evidence into a complete story. 
The issue of whether an animation is a precise re-
enactment or merely an illustration of what probably 
happened is more than a point of debate. In the 
recent trial, acquittal and re-trial in Italy of the 
defendants in the Meredith Kercher murder, much 
has been made of the equivocal forensic evidence 
(DNA on a knife and bra clasp), further confounded by 
questionable crime scene documentation and 
management.36 In addition, the conflicting accounts of 
multiple defendants and a singular guilty plea make 
this a complex case to unravel. What we can be sure 
of is that Meredith Kercher was murdered, and to 
some extent how the physical injuries resulted in her 
death. The more important fact – the one for the jury 
– is by whom and why. In the trial of Amanda Knox 
and Raffaele Sollecito (an additional co-defendant, 
Rudy Guede, had already pleaded guilty), much was 
made about their probable involvement, yet there is 
not really any dispute that Ms Kercher was killed. In 
reality, the fact that both Knox and Sollecito are 
jointly implicated is somewhat immaterial in relation 
to how Kercher died, i.e. the physical wounds and 
how they were inflicted. Had, for example, Knox’s 
lawyers argued that only Sollecito could have inflicted 
certain wounds due to his height or strength, then 
possibly the animated sequence presented before the 
court might have had some evidentiary value. 
However, there is little dispute over the eventual 
outcome, and given that there are a myriad of 
potential scenarios which might fit with the contested 
evidence in this case, not only does the animation 
seem ambitious, but potentially prejudicial to the 
case. As one commentator suggested: ‘The animation 
now seems to have been a mere fantasy, an animated 
version of the prosecution’s theory featuring Amanda 
Knox as a sex-crazed femme fatale.’37 
                                                          
35 Dale T. Miller and Cathy McFarland, ‘Counterfactual thinking and 
victim compensation: A test of norm theory’, Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, Volume 12, Number 4, 1986, 513-519. 
36 Leila Schneps and Coralie Colmez, Math on trial. How numbers 
get used and abused in the courtroom, (2013, Basic Books); 
Candace Dempsey, Murder in Italy, (2010, Berkley Books). 
37 Richard K. Sherwin, ‘The Digital Trial’, Project Syndicate, 12 
October 2011, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-
digital-trial . 
We may never know who killed Meredith Kercher, 
although at the time of writing, at least one person is 
serving a life-sentence for their guilty plea 
surrounding their involvement. What is quite 
apparent is that the animation is largely superfluous 
to increasing the juries understanding of what 
happened in the hours, days, weeks, months leading 
up to Meredith’s death.38 Unlike the animation-hybrid 
used in the Murtha trial,39 there is no point of 
reference for a juror to establish the validity of the 
sequence of events.40 The 20 minute HD animation – 
which allegedly cost nearly quarter of a million dollars 
to produce – uses Avatars to represent the events of 
November, 2007. There is no CCTV footage or 
definitive forensic material (e.g. a bloody handprint), 
to link the accused to the murder as depicted by the 
prosecution. Unlike the case of Murtha, there is no 
testimony or video footage to reveal what happened 
and what decisions were made; at best, it is a 
tentative attempt to make some sense out of a myriad 
of circumstantial evidence and flawed forensic 
analysis. Unfortunately, in attempting to recreate 
such events, jurors may fall foul of another decision 
error known as the Hindsight Bias, which has been 
shown to have an effect on legal-type decisions 
involving animation evidence. 
Juror bias and judgement heuristics 
The main criticism against just decision models – 
particularly the mathematical models – is that they 
are poor in explaining the actual cognitive processes 
which jurors make throughout a trial. Jurors operate 
as decision makers in environments of uncertainty: 
‘That different arguments are possible from the same 
evidence is one reason why there is a trial in the first 
place.’41 The more equivocal the inputs (evidence, 
testimony, etc.), the more difficult the decision 
process becomes for the juror. When there is doubt or 
complexity associated with certain judgments, then 
                                                          
38 Gareth Norris, ‘The use (and abuse) of computer generated 
exhibits in court’, The Brief (Tort, Trial and Insurance Practice 
Section – American Bar Association), Volume 40, 2011, 10-23. 
39 Connecticut v. Murtha (No. CR03-0568 598T) (Conn. Super. Ct. 
2006 – unpublished) (possibly State of Connecticut v. Murtha,). See 
Feigenson and Spiesel, pp. 92-98 for an outline of the facts. 
40 Barry Leibowitz, ‘Amanda Knox prosecutors investigated for 
Meredith Kercher “murder video”’, CBS News, 1 May 2102, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/amanda-knox-prosecutors-
investigated-for-meredith-kercher-murder-video/ . 
41 David Schum, ‘Argument Structuring and Evidence Evaluation’, in 
Reid Hastie, general editor, Inside the Juror: The Psychology of 
Juror Decision Making (1993, New York: Cambridge University 
Press), Chapter 7, 175. 
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heuristics and biases can result, leading to illogical and 
erroneous outcomes. In some respects, animations 
and CGEs serve to simplify this decision making 
process, although in doing so potentially exert undue 
influence over the juror. These in turn may render 
unsafe verdicts by introducing or exploiting specific 
heuristics of their own. Research into jury decision 
making suggests that the complexity of the trial 
process is problematic for achieving optimum verdicts 
based on the evidence and legal principles involved.42 
Some years ago in their review of The American Jury, 
Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel commented: 
‘It has not infrequently been charged that the 
modern jury is asked to perform heroic feats 
of attention and recall well beyond the 
capacities of ordinary men. A trial, it has been 
argued, presents to the jury a mass of 
material it cannot possibly absorb, and 
presents it in an artificial sequence which 
aggravates the jury’s intellectual problems.’43 
Hence, the models of jury decision making discussed 
in the previous section, serve to illustrate the way in 
which verdicts are reached. Understandably, they can 
be complex and multi-faceted; CGEs have developed 
in response to the difficult nature of this task and aim 
to simplify the overall process. Seemingly, the Story 
Model emerges with the most empirical support and 
also someway fits into the process animations seek to 
instil on the juror – a seamless and ready-made 
account of the crime or incident. 
However, as was previously discussed, the Story 
Model shared a basic theoretical connection with the 
Simulation Hypothesis proposed by Kahneman and 
Tversky – itself prone to errors of judgement and bias. 
The Simulation Hypothesis has generated a range of 
theoretical research which is generally referred to as 
counterfactual thinking, and herein lie some of the 
problems with the Story Model in relation to CGE. The 
link between counterfactual reasoning and other 
cognitive biases has also been explored, with the 
Hindsight Bias being implicated as a potential shared 
cognitive process under certain circumstances.44 In its 
                                                          
42 Henry Kaptein, ‘Burdens of evidence and proof: why bear them? A 
plea for principled opportunism in (leaving) legal factfinding (alone)’, 
in Hendrik Kaptein, Henry Prakken and Bart Verheij, general editors, 
Legal Evidence and Proof: Statistics, Stories, Logic, (2009, 
Farnham: Ashgate Publishing), Chapter 1. 
43 Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury, (1966, Boston: 
Little Brown and Co.), 149. 
44 Neal, J. Roese, ‘Twisted Pair: Counterfactual Thinking and the 
Hindsight Bias’, in Derek J. Koehler and Nigel Harvey, general 
basic form, the hindsight bias serves to influence 
decision making processes in the sense that we 
assume events were more predictable when we 
subsequently know the outcome.45 A trial is one such 
example; very often we know the charges under 
deliberation, but due to the hindsight bias we are 
unable to fully appreciate that information known 
after the event was previously unavailable or 
potentially irrelevant. For instance, during the 
investigation into the Columbia Space Shuttle 
accident, the presence of a known defective 
component almost lead to criminal charges of 
negligence. Terrorist attacks are another good 
illustration. In the months after the attacks on 11 
September 2001, Americans were significantly more 
likely to overestimate the level of risk posed by 
terrorists before the event, though relatively few even 
knew of the existence of Al Quada beforehand. In 
some instances, the hindsight bias can form the basis 
of conspiracy theories whereby major disasters, for 
example, Hurricane Katrina, are assumed to be 
‘known’ and predictable and the limited government 
response indicative of wider social and political 
motives. As Baruch Fischoff notes: ‘[people] not only 
tend to view what has happened as inevitable, but 
also tend to view it as having been ‘relatively 
inevitable’ before it happened.’46 
Returning to the legal situation, the hindsight bias is 
particularly problematic in the court, as jurors are 
generally aware of what has happened and then 
asked to reassess that likelihood in relation to the 
evidence presented and legal standard of proof.47 
Such situations serve to escalate the problems 
associated with this specific heuristic. Particularly in 
cases of negligence and malpractice, whether the 
defendant(s) could have reasonably known certain 
information or acted upon it is almost impossible to 
ascertain given the influence of hindsight. 
Assessments of risk of dangerousness by psychiatrists 
are by their very nature notoriously unreliable; yet 
when incidents do occur, mental health professionals 
                                                                                                  
editors, Blackwell Handbook of Judgement and Decision Making, 
(2008, Wiley-Blackwell), Chapter 13.  
45 Jonathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding, (2008, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), 4th Edition. 
46 Baruch Fischhoff, ‘Hindsight # foresight: The effect of outcome 
knowledge on judgment under uncertainty’, Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, Volume 1, 1975, 
288–299. 
47 Gordon V. Rose and James R. P. Ogloff, ‘Evaluating the 
comprehensibility of jury instructions: A method and an example’, 
Law and Human Behavior, Volume 25, 2001, 409-431. 
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are often criticised for not being aware of the warning 
signs. Attempts at de-biasing have received mixed 
empirical support, and efforts to get participants in 
studies to consider alternative scenarios have shown 
only a minimal sway on reducing the hindsight bias. In 
some respects, the trial process does present different 
sides of a story, and cross examination also seeks to 
highlight errors and omissions, including where 
decision makers may have been potentially unaware 
of the consequences of their actions. 
However, research has shown that animations 
presented in court can exert significant – more than 
double – the influence than less ‘dynamic’ textual 
descriptions can. Neal Roese and colleagues identify 
one primary concern for animation evidence in 
relation to the hindsight bias in the form of memory 
updating.48 Specifically, the ability of people to 
recapture earlier memories when new associations 
are created in memory is compromised when a 
misattribution of processing fluency is subjectively 
felt: ‘[…] when a coherent causal explanation accounts 
for the outcome […] when case relevant information 
feels familiar because of prior exposure […] and when 
case relevant information feels subjectively easy to 
bring to mind. Computer animation may increase 
hindsight bias because the clarity of the visual 
presentation enhances processing fluency.’49 In other 
words, the animation makes the account more simple 
to recall and hence ‘tricks’ us into inferring that this 
ease of processing is actually a result of more 
familiarity than actuality. 
In relation to road traffic accidents in particular, the 
issue of hindsight is fundamental to ascertaining the 
responsibilities and actions of all parties involved: 
‘The science of accident reconstruction is 
being naively misused by inviting and 
exacerbating hindsight bias when passing 
judgment on a driver’s unsuccessful response 
to avoid an accident. By focusing attention on 
the outcome, on how the driver should not 
have responded, and on how she or he could 
have done better, an accident reconstruction 
diagram can appropriately be called a 
hindsight diagram. A foresight diagram is 
offered to emphasize the uncertainty and lack 
                                                          
48 Neal J. Roese, Florian Fessel, Amy Summerville, Justin Kruger 
and Michael A. Dilich, ‘The Propensity Effect: When Foresight 
Trumps Hindsight’, Psychological Science, Volume 17, Issue 4, 
2006, 305–310. 
49 Roese, Fessel, Summerville, Kruger and Dilich, 305 
of information that confronted the reactive 
driver when the threat first became apparent 
so that those charged with the task of 
determining cause or attributing fault can 
better appreciate the situation that existed at 
that most relevant point in time.’50 
The question of whether a driver of a car could and 
would act in a particular way is difficult to re-create, 
although we can be fairly sure that jurors will rely 
upon their own experiences of driving and – in 
hindsight – speculate as to what they would have 
done in the same situation. Certainly, with the value 
of time and an appreciation of the outcome, this is 
problematic. 
The link between counterfactual thinking and the 
hindsight bias is not clear-cut; Roese and Vohs identify 
situations whereby counterfactuals could actually 
reduce hindsight errors.51 However, they caution that: 
‘[…] when counterfactual thinking spotlights a 
prominent antecedent cause that furnishes a 
satisfying explanation for the outcome […] then the 
counterfactual contributes to greater hindsight bias by 
way of sensemaking.’52 Hence, in situations high in 
ambiguity or where the causal chain is of relevance 
(such as in legal trials), then counterfactuals may 
aggravate hindsight biases: ‘The more a person can 
make sense of and inject meaning into the past, the 
greater the hindsight bias.’53 Further support for this 
link in legal situations comes from a series of 
experiments by Robbennault and Sobus: ‘It is likely 
that both counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias 
can and do come into play when jurors are asked to 
make post hoc judgments regarding events. In 
particular, the moderating effect of counterfactual 
thinking on hindsight bias sets important limits on 
when hindsight bias will be observed.’54 Ultimately, 
we can be fairly sure that when we are asked to 
reason contrary to the outcome we already know – 
either to estimate its probability or understand the 
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reasons why – then jurors are poor at remaining 
objective and to reason rationally. The use of CGE has 
been shown to significantly increase hindsight 
judgements and the link between the story model and 
counterfactual thinking (simulation hypotheses) also 
established. It is argued here that the use of CGE in 
some legal trials may increase the likelihood of jurors 
reasoning in a story model fashion and hence be 
overly exposed to the hindsight bias. 
Conclusion 
This article has set out some areas of concern over the 
use of CGE in legal proceedings and legal practices. 
Empirical studies have demonstrated that they exert 
an influence, and the emphasis here has been upon 
understanding how they are potentially problematic. 
It has been argued that in some instances they 
activate individual decision making heuristics and 
influence the more natural process by which we 
create mental representations of what has occurred. 
Similarly, there has been an attempt to assimilate this 
research into existing models of jury decision making. 
The Stochastic Process with its critical event was 
argued to be one possible explanation for why 
animations are seemingly so successful in court. The 
Story Model and the link with counterfactual thinking 
was again implicated as a potential area where CGE 
could demonstrate some influence; by minimising 
contradictory evidence and linking together testimony 
and evidence into a coherent and plausible plot was 
perhaps the most influential aspect. Potentially, many 
of these heuristics and models operate inter-
dependently, with the ‘better’ animations seemingly 
able to exploit multiple angles of comprehension and 
assimilation in the mind of the juror. 
Regardless of what the legal standards are for 
introducing CGEs into legal proceedings, it appears 
that there is relatively little understanding of the way 
in which these animations are potentially more than 
mere visual representations. The likely influence is 
significant; hence, all major trials have seemingly 
adopted the use of CGE as they would other 
consultants. Oscar Pistorius’ ‘Dream Team’ of forensic 
experts included the Evidence Room – a US-based 
forensic animation company to produce visual re-
enactments of what occurred on the night of 14 
February 2013.55 Legal professionals recognise the 
enormous power that multi-media presentations have 
                                                          
55 http://time.com/#5572/oscar-pistorius-dream-team-murder-trial/ . 
in the court, yet the industry which has grown up to 
service this demand is largely unregulated. Similarly, 
the legal standards of admissibility are relatively non-
existent. In cases where animations have been 
excluded, it appears that the judge as ‘gatekeeper’ is 
the dominant model of legal admissibility. What we 
can be sure of is that the reason CGE is so popular is 
due to the recognition of the powerful influence it can 
have over jurors; what we are less convinced about is 
whether the use of CGE is potentially prejudicing trials 
by exerting undue influence on the decision making 
abilities of jurors. What was once a way to illustrate 
complex sequences of events or technical evidence 
has become a way of targeting hard-wired cognitive 
processes inherent to human decision making. It is 
hard to imagine other experts or innovative 
techniques being able to enter our courts without 
their credentials and practices meeting scientific or 
professional standards; CGE as a predominantly 
demonstrative aid largely circumnavigates these legal 
criteria of admissibility. From the review presented 
here, it is suggested that whilst the demonstrative aid 
of the moving image has its place in legal proceedings, 
tighter regulation, more research and careful 
implementation are called for. 
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